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SETTING LIMITS ON SPOUSAL PRIVILEGES IN MARYLAND'S FEDERAL COURTS: 
THE VIRTUES AND VICES OF BRIGHT-LINE RULES 
by Eric H. Singer, Esq. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Under federal common law, in criminal cases a would-
be witness spouse holds the exclusive privilege to refuse 
to testify against the other spouse with respect to matters 
that might incriminate the non-testifying spouse. I This 
privilege, known as the adverse spousal testimonial 
privilege or the "anti-marital facts privilege," is supposed 
to apply not simply to conduct or events occurring during 
the marriage, but to pre-marital events as welJ.2 But 
Maryland's district court has split on the question of 
premarital applicability in two relatively recent, yet 
unnoticed decisions, with one district judge ruling 
embracing a per se rule against the privilege, and another 
decidedly, but respectfully, rejecting such a rule. 
This split, which is discussed in Part II of this 
Comment, leads one to question how Maryland's federal 
courts will decide a facet of the "confidential marital 
communications privilege," a sibling of the anti-marital facts 
privilege. The confidential martial communications 
privilege, which may be asserted by either spouse 
notwithstanding one spouse's willingness to testify against 
the other, bars testimony concerning intra-spousal 
confidential expressions made during the marital 
relationship.3 But should the privilege still apply when the 
communications at issue occur between spouses who, 
though still legally married, are separated, and if not, at 
precisely what degree of separation should the privilege 
yield? This issue, which has not yet been addressed by 
any reported Fourth Circuit opinion, is the focus of Part 
III. 
I See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980). 
2 See 2 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 505-41 (1990). 
3 See id. 
II. THE ADVERSE SPOUSAL TESTIMONIAL 
PRIVILEGE: THE DISTRICT COURT'S SPLIT 
ON PREMARITAL CONDUCT 
In In re Grand Jury Subpoena of [Witnessj,4 the 
potential witness spouse, or "Ms. Witness," as the court 
referred to her, invoked the adverse spousal testimonial 
privilege in a move to quash a grand jury subpoena for her 
testimony in a fraud investigation ofher new husband, "Mr. 
Target."5 Mr. Target and Ms. Witness, who had been 
romantically involved for several years, married one month 
after Ms. Witness was served with the subpoena and just 
before her expected grand jury appearance.6 The court 
found that the timing, if not the fact, of their marriage, was 
substantially motivated by the couple's desire to acquire 
the spousal privilege protection.7 Although the court held 
that the marriage did not qualify as an outright "sham," 
which would have precluded any use of the marital 
privilege,S it denied the motion to quash, or, as the court 
termed it, the "wedding gift" they had most sought - the 
spousal privilege to block the wife's grand jury testimony 
against her husband with respect to pre-marriage acts. 9 
In so holding, the court did not limit its decision to 
the particular facts of the case. Rather, the court adopted 
a per se rule from the Seventh Circuit case, United States 
v. Clark, 10 which held that the adverse spousal testimonial 
4 884 F. Supp. 188 (D. Md. 1995). 
l See id. at 189. 
6 See id. at 190. 
7 See id. 
R See id. (citing United States v. Apodaca, 522 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 
1975». 
9 See id. at 192. 
\II 712 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1983). 
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privilege does not cover acts occurring prior to marriage. I I 
The court in Clark believed such a categorical rule would 
be salutary as courts could avoid "mini-trials" on the 
sincerity of the couple's marriage. 12 Further, the ruling in 
Clark was in accord with the Supreme Court doctrine 
calling for privileges to be narrowly construed and 
subordinated to the greater interest of fact -fmding. 13 
The second Maryland federal district court case to 
address the adverse spouse testimonial privilege was A. B. 
v. United States. 14 InA.B., "Ms. A.B." moved to quash 
a grand jury subpoena for her testimony in an investigation 
of her husband, a drug trafficking suspect. 15 The subject 
of pre-marital collusion was not at issue in this case. 
However, the government did seek to question Ms. A.B. 
about events that occurred before her marriage, and Ms. 
A.B. did assert the adverse spousal testimonial privilege. 16 
In support of its request, the government offered the holding 
in In re Grand Jury Subpoena of [Witness}, and argued 
that the privilege did not apply to premarital events. 17 The 
court in A.B., however, rejected the bright line rule in In 
Re Grand Jury Subpoena of [Witness}, and granted Ms. 
A.B.' s motion to quash. 18 
The A. B. court noted that two cases decided by the 
Seventh Circuit after Clark specifically stated, albeit in 
dicta, that the general rule was that the adverse testimonial 
privilege includes matters that occurred prior to the 
marriage.19 Following these decisions, the court inA.B. 
II See id. at 302. 
12 See id. 
13 See id. 
14 24 F. Supp.2d 488 (D. Md. 1998). 
IS See id. at 489. 
16 See id. 
17 See id. at 491. 
18 See id. at 494. 
19 See id. (citing United States v. Byrd, 750 F.2d 585, 590 (7th Cir. 
1984); United States v. Lofton, 957 F.2d 476, 477 (7th Cir. 1992». 
30.1 U. Bait L.F. 66 
stated that the purpose of the spousal testimonial privilege 
was to protect "'family harmony by preventing spouses 
from becoming adversaries in criminal proceedings. "'20 
Furthermore, the court noted that the purpose of the 
privilege would be undermined and that "the effect on a 
marriage would be equally damaging whether the facts 
about which the witness testified occurred before or after 
the marriage."21 The court concluded that if a valid 
marriage exists, then the privilege against adverse spousal 
testimony should apply to all matters, whether they 
occurred before or after the marriage.22 Although the court 
in A.B. appeared sensitive to concerns about the bona 
fides of the marriage, it believed that the bright-line rule of 
In re Grand Jury Subpoena of [Witness} had gone too 
far and stated that "[a ]lthough it may be necessary for a 
court to delve occasionally into peripheral issues in 
determining the legitimacy of a marriage, this is a far more 
satisfactory outcome than simply eliminating all premarital 
matters from the scope of the privilege."23 
Of course, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit will be the penultimate arbiter of the 
conflict between In re Grand Jury Subpoena of 
[Witness} and A.B. In In re Grand Jury Subpoena of 
[Witness}, the court went so far as to predict that the 
Fourth Circuit would agree with its conclusion and that of 
the Seventh Circuit in Clark.24 In fact, however, the 
rejection of the bright line rule inA.B. in favor of an ad hoc 
factual inquiry seems more likely to prevail in light of the 
Fourth Circuit's warning that the marital privilege should 
not become an "empty promise."25 
Predictions aside, the court in A.B. does seem to 
have the better argument. As one federal court has found, 
211 See id. n.l (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 640 F.Supp. 988, 
989 (E.D. Mich. 1986». 
21 Id. at 492. 
22 See id. 
23 Id. 
24 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Witness, 884 F. Supp. at 191. 
2S See United States v. Morris, 988 F.2d 1335, 1339 (4th Cir. 1993). 
the rejection of the Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 
505(c)(2) in 1975, which would have precluded the 
spousal privilege for premarital acts, signals the rejection 
of a per se premarital acts exception.26 Furthermore, at 
least one other federal district court has concluded that 
the categorical premarital acts exception found in In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena of [Witness} simply cannot be 
harmonized with the policy behind the adverse spousal 
testimonial privilege.27 Finally, although the bright-line rule 
in In re Grand Jury Subpoena of [Witness}, like all 
bright-line rules, has the virtue of being easy to administer 
and does spare the courts a "mini-trial" in the marital arena, 
"sham marriages are not common enough to make the 
occasional mini-trial a great burden."28 In short, the court's 
holding inA. B. seems to strike the proper balance between 
maintaining a privilege that remains socially valued and 
protecting against the strategic maneuver of marrying to 
suppress testimony. 
III. THE MARITAL COMMUNICATIONS 
PRIVILEGE: A RULE FOR SEPARATED 
SPOUSES? 
As noted above, the confidential communications 
privilege bars "one spouse from testifying as to 
conversations or communications with the other spouse 
made in confidence during their marriage. "29 Unlike the 
adverse testimonial privilege, the marital communications 
privilege belongs to both spouses and may be asserted by 
either one. The privilege looks not to the particular 
marriage, but rather "seeks to protect the institution of 
marriage generally as a haven for confidential 
communication."30 The privilege is "premised on the 
assumption that confidences will not be sufficiently 
26 See United States v. Owens, 424 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). 
27 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 640 F. Supp. 988, 992 (E.D. 
Mich. 1986). 
21 Note, "Honey, The Judge Says We're History": Abrogating the 
Marital Privileges, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 843, 868 n.127 (1992) 
[hereinafter Abrogating the Marital Privileges]. 
29 2 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 2, at § 505-6. 
30 United States v. Byrd, 750 F.2d 585,591-92 (7th Cir. 1984). 
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encouraged unless the spouses are assured that their 
statements will never be SUbjected to forced disclosures."3) 
The Fourth Circuit, however, has not addressed 
whether a defendant who has confidentially conveyed 
information to his or her spouse when the two had been 
separated can still rightfully assert the privilege. At the 
state level in Maryland, the defendant may still assert the 
privilege. In Coleman v. State, 32 the Court of Appeals 
ofMruyland held that the marital communications privilege 
applied, even though, for all practical purposes, the 
defendant's marriage had ended at the time of the 
confidential communication. The court in Coleman fmUld 
that courts would generally have trouble determining the 
viability of the marriage, and that since the legislature had 
codified the marriage privilege without qualification, it was 
up to the legislature, and not the courts, to provide 
clarification.33 At least one commentator has suggested 
that the federal courts should adopt precisely this kind of 
categorical rule of non-inquiry into the viability of 
marriages.34 
It seems, however, far too late for the federal courts 
to adopt such a rule. Tasked with interpreting common 
law privileges, including the marital privileges, "in light of 
reason and experience" under Federal Rule of Evidence 
501, federal courts have clearly decided that the de jure 
validity of a marriage cannot per se "reasonably" trump 
the quest for full and complete fact-finding. The question 
for Maryland's federal district court and all other courts in 
the Fourth Circuit is notwhetherthe marital communications 
privilege yields when the communications at issue occurred 
when the spouses were separated, but at what point in the 
separation (prior to divorce) it should yield. 
The Fourth Circuit will have to choose between the 
relatively easily applied rule of "permanent separation" 
adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Byrd, and the more 
detail-oriented and apparently higher threshold of 
"separation plus irreconcilability" created by the Ninth 
31 Id. 
32 281 Md. 538, 544-55, 380 A.2d 49, 53-54 (1977). 
33/d. 
34 See Abrogating the Martial Privileges, supra note 28, at 843. 
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Circuit in United States v. Roberson. 3S 
In Byrd, the Seventh Circuit ruled that: 
[S]ociety's interest in protecting the 
confidentiality of the relationships of 
permanently separated spouses is 
outweighed by the need to secure 
evidence in the search for truth that is 
the essence of a criminal trial, and that 
proof of permanent separated status at 
the time of the communication between 
the defendant and the defendant's spouse 
renders the communications privilege 
automatically inapplicable.36 
In Byrd, the defendant, who was charged with arson, 
and his wife had been separated for approximately one 
year when Mr. Byrd uttered some cryptic yet inculpatory 
remarks to her.37 The couple had lived in separate homes 
during the separation, although the wife allowed the 
defendant to use her basement as a workroom.38 Prior to 
the defendant's trial, the wife filed for divorce.39 Although 
the court in Byrd never defined "permanent separation," it 
remarked that the "defendant's conversations are 
unprivileged because they were all made during a long-
term separation of the spouses .... "40 Though Byrd's 
standard of "permanent separation" is imprecise, clearly it 
is not synonymous with the notion of "irreconcilability ." 
As the court in Byrd stated, "[w]e refuse to extend the 
communications privilege to permanently separated 
couples on the theory a guaranteed protection of 
31 859 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1988). 
36 Byrd, 750 F.2d at 593. 
37 See id. at 588. 
3A See id. 
39 See id. 
4°ld. at 592 n.3. The Second Circuit has also held that the duration of 
confidentiality at this stage might save some troubled 
marriages."41 
In United States v. Roberson, the Ninth Circuit 
rejected what it called Byrd's "categorical rule of'pennanent 
separation "'42 when it created a rule allowing the spouse 
to assert the marital communication privilege unless at the 
time of the communication the couple was irreconcilably 
separated.43 In Roberson, two months after the husband 
left the marital home, the defendantlhusband told his wife 
about a rape he had committed.44 Immediately upon 
leaving the marital home, the husband had initiated an 
action for dissolution of the marriage.4S At the same time, 
the wife had obtained a temporary restraining order 
preventing the husband from re-entering the home or from 
contacting her.46 At trial, the wife testified, and the husband 
agreed, that the marriage had failed before the time of 
communication.47 After considering the Roberson's 
pending divorce action, the temporary restraining order, 
and the testimony, the trial judge concluded that at the 
time of the communication the marriage was all but 
defunct.48 The appeals court affirmed and held that the 
trial judge had correctly concluded that at the time of the 
communication the marriage was effectively over and that 
the marital communications privilege should not apply.49 
The court in Roberson rejected Byrd and prescribed 
a two-step inquiry. After the trial court determines whether 
the husband and wife have separated at the time of the 
communication, it must then "undertake a more detailed 
41 Id. at 593. 
42 Roberson, 859 F.2d at 1381. 
43 See id. 
44 See id. at 1377. 
41 See id. 
46 See id. 
47 See id. 
physical separation is the primary factor in determining "permanent 41 See id. at 1378. 
separation." See In re Witness Before Grand Jury, 791 F.2d 234, 238 
(2d Cir. 1986). 49 See id. at 1382. 
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investigation into the irreconcilability of the marriage" at 
that time and into whether the couple "had abandoned all 
hope."5o Factors that the trial court must consider when 
making its determination include the stability of the marriage 
at the time of the communication, any divorce actions filed 
at the time, divorce pleadings, settlement agreements or 
proposed property agreements, allegations of gross 
misconduct or grievances over a period of time, reasons 
given by the parties for prolonged absence from the home, 
and the couple's statements as to irreconcilability.51 
When deciding whether the privilege applies, other 
federal circuits have referred to both Byrd and Roberson 
without choosing the standard from either case.52 The 
Fourth Circuit, however, should affIrmatively select the 
Seventh Circuit's marital communications privilege rule of 
"permanent separation" over the Ninth Circuit's rule of 
"nTeconcilability" for three reasons. 
First, it is relatively easy for couples to follow and 
rely upon the "permanent separation" standard. While it 
is true that the "[marital communication] privilege only 
weakly serves the purpose for which it exists, in that few 
couples presumably know of this privilege or rely on it 
when making marital confidences[,],,53 the permanent 
separation standard would generate less uncertainty than 
would "irreconcilability" as to when spousal 
communications will remain confidential. Second, if the 
courts are to continue assessing marital viability, 
determining whether a couple is substantially physically 
estranged is far easier for the courts than determining 
whether their marriage is irrevocably defunct. 54 Third, and 
more important, this bright-line rule, unlike that adopted 
in Clark and In re Grand Jury Subpoena of [Witness], 
does little violence to the specific purposes of the marital 
,,, See id. at I3 81. 
'I See id. 
'2 See e.g .• United States v. Frank, 869 F.2d 1177, 1179 (8th Cir. 
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 839 (1989); United States v. Treff, 924 
F.2d 975 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 958 (1991). 
'3 Byrd, 750 F.2d at 593. 
,. See id. at 592-93. 
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communications privilege itself. Because evidentiary 
privileges impede the truth-seeking process, they are meant 
to be construed narrOWly. 55 In Roberson, however, the 
Ninth Circuit struck a balance between privilege and fact-
finding unduly favorable to spouses. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
"[S]ociety has little interest in protecting the 
confidentiality of separated couples whose marriage has 
failed by the time of the communication."56 However true, 
whether the marital communications privilege should give 
way to society's truth-seeking interests only when 
irreconcilability is established is open to serious doubt. 
Do separated couples actually maintain an expectation of 
confidentiality up until the time they view their marriages 
as defunct, as opposed to when they are permanently 
separated? Should the community's interest in truth-
seeking in criminal trials really be suspended until marriage 
has failed, as opposed to when the couple has permanently 
separated? It will be interesting to see just how solicitous 
of the privilege the Fourth Circuit will prove to be. 
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"See United States v. Nixon. 418 U.S. 683, 7\0 (1974). 
'6 Roberson, 859 F.2d at 1380 (citing United States v. Byrd, 750 F.2d 
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